A landmark report released by the Hoover Institution warns that the convergence of artificial intelligence and advanced biotechnology is dramatically increasing global biosecurity risks, making the creation and spread of dangerous pathogens more accessible than ever before. The analysis, titled “Biosecurity Really: A Strategy for Victory,” argues that historic approaches to managing biological threats are rapidly becoming obsolete and calls for urgent, comprehensive action to prevent potentially catastrophic outcomes. The document stresses that without a fundamental shift in strategy, the world faces a future where biological threats are more numerous, frequent, and consequential.
The report, authored by a team from the institution’s Bio-Strategies and Leadership Initiative (BSL), puts forward a novel framework centered on a critical principle: using the tools of modern biology to secure biology itself. This approach is likened to the cybersecurity principle of needing advanced software to defend against threats created by software. Lead author Drew Endy, a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, stated that “advancing and securing biotechnology innovation is essential for securing biology.” The authors contend that passive, reactive measures are insufficient and that proactive leadership in key technologies is the only viable path to ensuring a stable and prosperous future. The report frames the challenge not just as a defensive necessity but as an innovation race the United States cannot afford to lose.
The Accelerating Threat Landscape
The core of the report’s warning lies in the rapid democratization of powerful biological tools. Technologies such as DNA printers and generative AI models are significantly lowering the barrier to entry for designing and creating novel toxins and pathogens. Endy notes that within the last decade, the ability to build viruses from scratch has become commonplace, yet the governance frameworks for such research have failed to keep pace. The report highlights a future where distributed biomanufacturing could allow individuals or groups anywhere in the world to source or create nearly any pathogen, including those with pandemic potential like smallpox or Ebola.
This technological acceleration is unfolding in a geopolitical context of rising distrust among nations. The report argues that security strategies must now assume distrust as a default state and build verification mechanisms accordingly. The authors point to a concerning lack of multilateral governance for research involving the most dangerous pathogens, combined with active bioweapons programs in some nation-states that require de-escalation. The convergence of these technological, social, and political trends creates a uniquely volatile environment, demanding a complete overhaul of how biosecurity is perceived and managed on a global scale.
A Strategy Centered on Proactive Innovation
The “Biosecurity Really” report reframes the solution away from simple restriction and toward strategic advancement. It argues that the very technologies creating the risks hold the key to mitigating them. The authors advocate for harnessing biotechnology to strengthen critical defense systems, including advanced surveillance networks, rapid-response vaccine and diagnostic platforms, and novel medical treatments. This requires not just funding but a coherent national and international strategy to lead in critical fields. According to distinguished visiting fellow Mike Kuiken, “Biosecurity requires U.S. leadership in emerging biotechnology. Leadership means innovation. We must advance the field to secure it.”
Developing Biological Intelligence
A cornerstone of the proposed strategy is the creation of a sustained biological intelligence program, or BIOINT. This initiative would be dedicated to understanding the evolving threat landscape, tracking capabilities around the world, and providing policymakers with the foresight needed to act before a crisis emerges. Such a program would analyze complex biological data to anticipate potential threats, whether they are naturally occurring, accidentally released, or deliberately engineered. The goal is to move beyond reacting to outbreaks and toward preventing them by understanding the underlying technological and geopolitical currents.
Rethinking Governance and Oversight
The report calls for significant changes to governance at both national and international levels. One key recommendation is the stricter, multilateral regulation of research involving pathogens with pandemic potential. To manage the pervasive distrust among global actors, the authors suggest a system of private-sector bio-audits to verify compliance and build confidence. This would create a mechanism for transparency that does not solely rely on the goodwill of governments. The authors also stress the need for stronger public health infrastructure, citing improved indoor air quality standards as a practical measure to reduce transmission of airborne pathogens.
The Geopolitical Race for Bio-Leadership
The report explicitly frames the future of biotechnology as a “winner-take-all” race with profound national security implications. It warns that overregulation and a lack of competitive strategy in the U.S. have pushed vital research and development overseas, particularly to China. Endy highlights the development of “operating systems for life,” foundational platforms that he predicts will be completed within the next several years, and cautions, “They’re either going to happen in the United States or in Shenzhen.” The nation that achieves this breakthrough first will gain a significant economic and strategic advantage.
To counter this trend, the report advocates for the creation of a National Biotechnology Coordination Office to oversee a cohesive federal strategy. This would include building federally funded AI labs dedicated to processing highly technical biological data, ensuring the U.S. can compete and lead in this critical domain. The underlying message is that ceding leadership in biotechnology is not just an economic risk but a direct threat to national and global security, as it would mean losing control over the technologies that will define the future of both peace and conflict.
A Call for Urgent, Collective Action
Ultimately, the Hoover Institution report is a call for a society-wide mobilization. The authors emphasize that securing the future of biology requires a commitment not only from governments and scientists but from the public as well. They recommend promoting broad bio-literacy to ensure citizens understand the stakes and can participate in crucial policy conversations. The report concludes on a hopeful but firm note, asserting that a world free from preventable biological harms is possible. The authors express a vision where coordinated, proactive, and innovative action could make COVID-19 the last pandemic humanity ever faces. However, they stress this future is not guaranteed and can only be achieved if their call to action is answered with urgency and resolve.